Some of these are routine, even inevitable - from the complications of multi-agency coordination to frequent personnel changes.
Others are more specific to the realm of intelligence, notably a deep-seated uneasiness in parts of the CIA over the notion of unveiling putative secrets.
In the context of the disputed Iran volume, HAC members worried about the "random" nature of these provisions which gave the agency "a second bite at the apple." The implication is that the CIA will feel little obligation to help meet the HO's legal requirement if it believes its own "equities" are at stake.
(This of course may still affect the Iran volume, currently scheduled for 2014 publication.) Is It the British?
Background on FRUS and the Mosaddeq Period By statute, the FRUS series is required to present "a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record" of American foreign policy. That law came about partly as a consequence of the failure of the original volume covering the Mosaddeq period (published in 1989) to mention the U. Prominent historian Bruce Kuniholm, a former member of State's Policy Planning Staff, called the volume "a fraud." The full story of the scandal has been detailed elsewhere, but most observers blamed the omission on the intelligence community (IC) for refusing to open its relevant files. Senior Department officials joined in opposing requests for access to particular classified records by the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), the group of independent scholars charged with advising the Department's own Office of the Historian. The head of the HAC, Warren Cohen, resigned in protest in 1990 citing his inability to ensure the integrity of the FRUS series.
Nematollah Nassiri, who attempted to serve Mosaddeq with a firman from the Shah, is directly behind the prime minister. The Foreign Office feared that a planned State Department publication would undermine U. standing in Iran, according to declassified records posted on the National Security Archive's Web site today. The declassified documents, from the Foreign Office (Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1968), shed light on a protracted controversy over crucial gaps in the State Department's authoritative (FRUS) series.( The United Kingdom sought to expunge "very embarrassing" information about its role in the 1953 coup in Iran from the official U. The British censorship attempt happened in 1978, but London's concerns may play a role even today in holding up the State Department's long-awaited history - even though U. The blank spots on Iran involve the CIA- and MI6-backed plot to overthrow the country's prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq.Six decades after his ouster, some signs point to the CIA as the culprit for refusing to allow basic details about the event to be incorporated into the FRUS compilation. Recently, the CIA has declassified a number of records relating to the 1953 coup, including a version of an internal history that specifically states the agency planned and helped implement the coup. There is also evidence that State Department officials have been just as anxious to shield British interests over the years.Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, May 1, 2004 Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran June 22, 2004 The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953 November 29, 2000 CIA Secrecy Claims Are "Facially Incredible," Says Lawsuit August 2, 20 Coup 60 Years On: A Symposium July 24, 2013 Donald N.Wilber, an archeologist and authority on ancient Persia, served as lead U. planner of TPAJAX (along with British SIS officer Norman Darbyshire).